# Vérification par preuve formelle de logiciel de vol spatial

« Preuve de modèle, preuve de programme »

CYCLE DE CONFÉRENCES TECHNIQUES SUR LES MÉTHODES FORMELLES DE DÉVELOPPEMENT

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#### **Motivations**

- Main reasons to use verification by proof
  - Quality of verification
    - Exhaustivity
    - Non ambiguous representation
  - Costs
    - Reduce cost of verification phase
    - Reduce cost during total lifecycle of software
    - Reduce maintenance costs



#### **Objectives**

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Main objectives:

- 1. Formal proof integration into the V-development cycle for embedded project
- 2. Formal proof advantages compared to validation by test
- 3. Frama-C Technical maturity Evaluation
- 4. Cost impact evaluation compared to validation by test



#### Context

- Two space embedded software have been used for this study
  - **Software 1**: Embedded software already validated by test
    - Known validation by test costs
    - Bugs undiscovered by test
  - **Software 2:** Embedded software currently in development
    - Specification and conception undefined
    - Architecture based on components



## Tooling

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Frama-C platform



- Deductive proof (Hoare, Dijkstra)
- Function contracts with ACSL
  - **`requires**' = preconditions
  - **`ensures**' = postcondition
  - 'behavior' and 'assumes' : fonctionnal cases
  - `assigns' : defines side effects





Topology of a proof project



#### Methodology



- Proof on Software 1
  - First apply Solution B (formalization at the design level) : considered not relevant for this use case
  - Secondly, Solution A (formalization at le Software Requirement level)
  - Results:2 bugs detected
    - One about a comparison between two pointers of a circular buffer.
      - Formalization with the mathematic modulo
      - Problem at the end of a range
    - Second one on the arguments passed to a System Call
      - Formalization of the interface of the mktime() system call
      - Missing initialization of an input field
      - Non functional property (not defined in Software Requirement)



#### Example

```
/*@
  axiomatic math mod
    logic integer math mod(integer a, integer b);
    axiom math mod1 : \forall integer a,b; 0<=a<b && b>0 ==> math mod(a,b)==a;
    axiom math mod2 : \forall integer a,b; -b<=a<0 && b>0 ==>
math mod(a, b) == a+b;
*/
/*@
  axiomatic detection
    predicate range ko(integer index1, integer index2, integer size, integer
delta) = 0<math mod((index2-index1), size)<delta;</pre>
* /
```

```
behavior b2all_range_ok:
    assumes ! range_ko(INDEX_W, INDEX_READ, NB_ELEMT, DELTA_NOM);
    ensures b2all_range_ok: FLAG_ERROR == \old(FLAG_ERROR);
```

- Proof on Software 2
  - Software with only source code
  - Solution C considered as not relevant
  - Solution B ReEngineering a design from source code + formalization of the design
  - Results
    - Simple functions well verified without bugs
    - Technical difficulties encountered for other functions
    - Methodological result : function contract for design description



- Formal proof integration into the V-development cycle for embedded project
  - Formalization of high level requirement if better, although HLR are not entirely formalized
- Formal proof advantages compared to validation by test
  - Exhaustive, non ambiguous, no need of hardware to execute tests programs
- Frama-C Technical maturity Evaluation
  - Proof feature was in development, some difficulties with data aliasing (multiple access to same location of memory)
- Cost impact evaluation compared to validation by test
  - Quality of verification already demonstrated
  - Waiting for improvements of the tool to use it in a more general way



## Conclusion

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- Verification HLR
  - Close to informal specification, good traceability
  - High quality level
- Formal Verification for hard point verification
  - Mix of skills : integrated team (functional specialist + formal proof specialist)
- Current limitation
  - Tool definition : requires program well typed, no low level semantic
  - Tool maturity : need improvements for alias cases, floating points
- For a more extensive usage
  - Context of design or low level requirement:
     Methodologically ok, maturity of tool expected soon
  - For low level:

Good use case in proof of integration driver + applicative



#### Thank you

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