



# Model Checking of Aerospace Domain Models in an Industrial Context

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Forum Méthodes Formelles  
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**Rockwell  
Collins**

# Agenda

1. Presentation of Rockwell Collins

2. The RC formal analysis framework

3. Case studies

- Adaptive Display & Guidance System
- UAV Flight Control System
- Effector Blender
- Triplex Sensor Voter

} US  
France



Presentation

**ROCKWELL COLLINS**


## Who Are We?

**A World Leader In Aviation Electronics And Airborne/ Mobile Communications Systems For Commercial And Military Applications**



▶ **Communications**


▶ **Navigation**



▶ **Automated Flight Control**

▶ **Displays / Surveillance**

▶ **Aviation Services**



▶ **In-Flight Entertainment**

▶ **Integrated Aviation Electronics**

▶ **Information Management Systems**




## Rockwell Collins

Headquartered in Cedar Rapids, Iowa

~20.000 Employees Worldwide

Present in 27 countries



## Rockwell Collins France

- 700+ employees, mainly located in Toulouse, France
- R&D, development of own products and technologies (direction finder, ...)
- Systems and equipments for aircraft and rotary wing manufacturers (Airbus, Eurocopter, Augusta,...)
  - Communication, Navigation, Radar, Surveillance, Cockpit equipments
- We provide communication systems for European MODs (radio, networks)
  - Software define radio, Data Links (Link11, Link 16,...), Localization and SAR (Search And Rescue) equipments



## RCI Advanced Technology Center



Commercial Systems



Government Systems

### Advanced Technology Center

- **The Advanced Technology Center (ATC) identifies, acquires, develops and transitions value-driven technologies**
- **The Automated Analysis section of ATC applies mathematical tools and reasoning**

## FM at Rockwell Collins France


- Since March 2009, 1 research engineer in Toulouse
- 2011 to 2013: PhD student – Combination of different techniques (model checking, abstract interpretation, ...)
- Objectives:
  - Extension of the Automated Analysis section in the US
  - Participate in French and European Research Projects
  - Collaboration with industrial partners and customers and share experiences with them
  - Contact with European Research Institutions
  - Evaluation of tools (especially open source)



## Activities in Model Checking

- Application in Model-Based Development
  - MATLAB Simulink®, Esterel Technologies SCADe Suite™
  - Enable early simulation and debugging
- Development of an in-house tool
  - Translator framework as front-end to different proof systems

Reduce Costs and Improve Quality  
By Using Analysis to Find Errors  
During **Early** Design




In-House Tool


# TRANSLATOR FRAMEWORK

## Our In-House Tool: The Rockwell Collins Translator Framework

- Purpose : Formal Analysis of **SCADE™** and **MATLAB Simulink®** models
- **Long term effort** in the domain of formal methods
- Used on **several projects** (see articles by Steven Miller and Michael Whalen, e.g. *Software model checking takes off*, CACM 53(2), 2010)
- Can output **optimized descriptions** in input languages of several **different analyzers**




# The Rockwell Collins Translator Framework





# A Product Family of Translators

- Many small Lustre-to-Lustre translation passes
- Each pass refines closer to the target language
- Target specific optimizations



## Translators Optimize for Specific Analysis Tools

Model	CPU Time (For NuSMV to Compute Reachable States)		Improvement
	Before	After	
Mode1	> 2 hours	11 sec	> 650x
Mode2	> 6 hours	169 sec	> 125x
Mode3	> 2 hours	14 sec	> 500x
Mode4	8 minutes	< 1 sec	480x
Arch	34 sec	< 1 sec	34x
WBS	29+ hours	1 sec	105,240x



Model Checking

# CASE STUDIES

# ADGS-2100 Adaptive Display & Guidance System



**Modeled in Simulink**

**Translated to NuSMV**

**4,295 Subsystems**

**16,117 Simulink Blocks**


**Over  $10^{37}$  Reachable States**

## Example Requirement:

**The Cursor Shall Never be  
Positioned on an Inactive Display**

**Counterexample Found in 5 Seconds**

**Checked 563 Properties -  
Found and Corrected 98 Errors  
in Early Design Models**





# ADGS-2100 Technology Transfer


## Iteration 1

## Iteration 2


## Iteration 3

Dev.  
Group  
(Blue)


ATC  
Group  
(Beige)



Translation Time: 1-4 Hours  
Turnaround: 1 Day to 1 Week



Translation Time: 10 Minutes  
Turnaround: 3 Hours to 2 Days



Translation Time: 10 Minutes  
Turnaround: 10 Minutes

## Conclusion of this case study



Model Checking is successful in finding errors in early design models of our products

## Case study for CerTA FCS Project (US)

- Sponsored by the Air Force Research Labs
- Can formal verification complement or replace some testing?
- Example Model – Lockheed Martin Adaptive UAV Flight Control System


### Lockheed Martin Aero

- Based on Testing
- Developed Tests from Requirements
- Executed Tests Cases on Test Rig

### Rockwell Collins

- Based on Model-Checking
- Developed Properties from Requirements
- Proved Properties using Model-Checking

# CerTA FCS Phase I - OFP Redundancy Management Logic



## CerTA FCS Phase I – Errors Found

### Errors Found in Redundancy Manager

	Model Checking	Testing
Triplex Voter	<b>5</b>	<b>0</b>
Failure Processing	<b>3</b>	<b>0</b>
Reset Manager	<b>4</b>	<b>0</b>
Total	<b>12</b>	<b>0</b>

- Model-Checking Found 12 Errors that Testing Missed
- Spent More Time on Testing than Model-Checking
  - 60% of total on testing vs. 40% on model-checking


## Conclusion of this case study



Model-checking was more  
cost effective  
than testing at finding errors  
in design models of our products

## Second use case for CerTA FCS Project (US)

- Sponsored by the Air Force Research Labs
- Can Model Checking be Used on Numerically Complex Systems?
- Example Model
  - Lockheed Martin Adaptive UAV Flight Control System
  - Generates actuator commands for aircraft control surfaces
  - Matrix arithmetic of real numbers



## **CerTA FCS Phase II – Verification of Floating Point Numbers**

- Translate Floating Point Numbers into Fixed Point
  - Extended translation framework to automate this translation
  - Convert floating point to fixed point (scaling provided by user)
  
- Advantages & Issues
  - Use bit-level integer decision procedures for model checking
  - Results unsound due to loss of precision
  - Very valuable tool for debugging



## **CerTA FCS Phase II - Results**

- Errors Found
  - Five previously unknown errors that would drive actuators past their limits
  - Several implementation errors were being masked by defensive programming

## Conclusion of this case study



**Model-Checking is useful for  
debugging  
numerically complex systems**



## Analysis of a Triplex Sensor Voter (RCF)


- Prove
  - Stability
  - Absence of runtime errors
  - Correct choice of parameters
- Analysis based on modern SMT solvers
- No abstraction of real numbers

## Case Study : Triplex Sensor Voter

- Compute an output from input of **three redundant sensors**
- Modelled in **Simulink**
- Uses arithmetical operations on **real values**
- Includes low pass filtering, so has **internal state**

## Sensor Characteristics



- Non-faulty sensors furnish a value within an interval around true value determined by a constant **MaxDev**



- In our analysis, we assume that sensors are **non-faulty**
- Result allows to parameterize automatic **fault detection**

## Structure and Operation of the Voter

- From each of the three inputs, subtract an equalization value
- Output is middle value of equalized values
- Equalization based on integration (has internal state)



## Industrial Context of the Analysis

- **Legacy** model (~20 years old)
- Reverse engineering – **why** and **how** does it work ?
- Finding right **parameters** by testing is **very time consuming**
- Has been **qualified**, high confidence
- **Modifications** are made now
  - Better usage of Simulink
  - 4th input ?
- **New application** areas
- **No experience** in how to analyse it

## Objectives of the Analysis

- Prove that a **transient peaks** cannot occur
  - Bounded-input bounded-output stability
- Choose good **parameters** for fault detection
  - a non-faulty sensor is never eliminated
- Experiment our **translator framework** on this kind of system
  - Feedback to implementors of proof engines



## Equations of the Normal Operation Mode

$$\text{Equalization}A_0 = 0.0$$

$$\text{Equalization}B_0 = 0.0$$

$$\text{Equalization}C_0 = 0.0$$

$$\text{Centering}_t = \text{middleValue}(\text{Equalization}A_t, \text{Equalization}B_t, \text{Equalization}C_t)$$

$$\text{Equalized}A_t = \text{Input}A_t - \text{Equalization}A_t$$

$$\text{Equalized}B_t = \text{Input}B_t - \text{Equalization}B_t$$

$$\text{Equalized}C_t = \text{Input}C_t - \text{Equalization}C_t$$


$$\text{VoterOutput}_t = \text{middleValue}(\text{Equalized}A_t, \text{Equalized}B_t, \text{Equalized}C_t)$$

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Equalization}A_{t+1} = & \text{Equalization}A_t + \\ & 0.05 * (\text{sat}_{0.5}(\text{Equalized}A_t - \text{VoterOutput}_t) - \text{sat}_{0.25}(\text{Centering}_t)) \end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Equalization}B_{t+1} = & \text{Equalization}B_t + \\ & 0.05 * (\text{sat}_{0.5}(\text{Equalized}B_t - \text{VoterOutput}_t) - \text{sat}_{0.25}(\text{Centering}_t)) \end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Equalization}C_{t+1} = & \text{Equalization}C_t + \\ & 0.05 * (\text{sat}_{0.5}(\text{Equalized}C_t - \text{VoterOutput}_t) - \text{sat}_{0.25}(\text{Centering}_t)) \end{aligned}$$

# MATLAB Simulink Model of the Voter



## Questions for the Analysis



- Is this system **stable** if sensors are non-faulty, i.e. is the output always within some bound from the true value?  
*Bounded-Input-Bounded-Output stability*
- Is an **implementation** using floating point arithmetic stable? Can there be an **accumulation** of rounding errors, causing loss of stability / overflow?
- Observation: system is stable if Equalization values are bounded -> prove that **Equalization values** are bounded

## Model Level Analysis Result

- Set MaxDev = 0.2 (typical value)
- Model level analysis can **prove stability**
- The following property can be found and proven **automatically**:

$$|\text{EqualizationA}| \leq 0.4 \text{ and}$$

$$|\text{EqualizationB}| \leq 0.4 \text{ and}$$

$$|\text{EqualizationC}| \leq 0.4$$

- Automated analysis based on the research results of our PhD student Adrien Champion

## Key to Analysis Objectives : Inductive Invariant

**For MaxDev = 0.2**

$$|\text{EqualizationA}| \leq 0.4$$

$$|\text{EqualizationB}| \leq 0.4 \quad \text{Proof objective}$$

$$|\text{EqualizationC}| \leq 0.4$$

$$|\text{EqualizationA} - \text{EqualizationB}| \leq 0.4$$


$$|\text{EqualizationA} - \text{EqualizationC}| \leq 0.4$$

$$|\text{EqualizationB} - \text{EqualizationC}| \leq 0.4$$

Automatically  
generated lemmas

$$|\text{EqualizationA} + \text{EqualizationB} + \text{EqualizationC}| \leq 0.66$$

# Inductive Octagonal Invariant



## Code level analysis (floating point)

- Proof on model level assumes that no rounding errors occur
- In an implementation using floating point, rounding errors may accumulate
- **The invariant was partially confirmed on a C implementation using Astrée (abstract interpretation) based on the result from model checking**
  - **Combination of MC and AI**
- At the current state, a complete proof with Astrée is not possible
- Rounding errors can be over-approximated at model level, but this lacks scalability

## Conclusion of this case study



**Model-Checking is useful for  
proving properties  
of numerically complex systems  
and their floating point  
implementation**



## Systematic Industrial Application



- Despite the conclusive case studies, there is still no systematic application of model checking at RC
- **Why ?**

## Obstacles to Systematic Application

- Still too much user skills required
  - Difficult for domain engineers
  - But there is progress in automated invariant generation
- Difficulty to express formal properties
  - But formal requirements engineering might help
- Scalability
  - Considerable progress in SMT solving
- Limited Scope
  - Lack of support for non-linear functions
- Cost is difficult to predict



# Certification



- Objective: use analysis results as evidence for certification
- Not yet done today
- Enabled by latest standard DO-178C
- A research project is ongoing at RC with University of Iowa (Cesare Tinelli) based on the kind2 tool

## Future Work: Cyber Security

- Cyber security of embedded systems is an issue
- Use model checking on cyber security requirements
- Prove the absence of security flaws in our systems
- We intend to initiate a collaborative project on the application of formal methods to cyber security



## Further interests in formal methods at RC

- Combining analysis methods
  - PhD student, French research project CAFEIN
- Architectural analysis (AADL, SysML)
  - Participation in French « Project P », projects in the US
- Requirements engineering (generation of properties)
  - French research project co-submitted
- Automated Test Generation
  - Participation in ARTEMIS project MBAT

# It's time for Questions



# Thank you for your attention

