

# Innovating Tool for Software Security the Frama-C Framework

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1. Frama-C
2. Value Analysis
3. Runtime Monitoring

```

long ra
for (i = 0; i < n; i++)
  C[i][i] = 0;
tmp2 = ...
// ...

```

```

tmp2[i][i] = (i < (n-1)) ? (i+1) : (i); // The [i][i] coefficient of the matrix product MC2*TMP2, that is, *MC2*(TMP1) = MC2*(MC1*M1) = MC2*M1*MC1
tmp1[i][i] = 0; k = 5; k--> tmp1[i][k] += mc2[i][k] * tmp2[k][i]; // Final rounding: tmp2[i][i] is now represented on 9 bits: *if (tmp1[i][i] < -256) m2[i][i] = -256; else if (tmp1[i][i] > 255) m2[i][i] = 255; else m2[i][i] = tmp1[i][i];

```





- ▶ extensible framework for C code verification [Kirchner et al @FAC'15]
- ▶ strong **safety & security guarantees** for **critical applications**
- ▶ **open source**, with close-source extensions
- ▶ both **academic** and **industrial** usage

<http://frama-c.com>



## ACSL = ANSI/ISO C Specification Language

*lingua franca* of Frama-C's analyzers :

- ▶ **verify** annotations
- ▶ **generate** annotations to be verified by other means
- ▶ 

```
/*@ assert \valid(p); */
/*@ assert y+1 != 0; */
x = *p / (y+1);
```

long ra  
for 0 <=  
C1) if (m  
tmp2 =  
of the

tmp2[0] = 1 << (n-1) else if (tmp1[0]) >= 1 << (n-1) - 1; else tmp2[0] = tmp1[0]; /\* Then the second part takes for the first part  
tmp1[0] = 0; k = 5; k--> tmp1[0] += m2[0][k] \* tmp2[k]; /\* The [j] coefficient of the matrix product MC2\*TMP2, that is, \*MC2\*(TMP1) = MC2\*(MC1\*M1) = MC2\*M1 \*MC1  
k = 1; tmp1[0] >= 1; /\* Final rounding: tmp2[0] is now represented on 9 bits: if (tmp1[0] < -256) tmp2[0] = -256; else if (tmp1[0] > 255) tmp2[0] = 255; else tmp2[0] = tmp1[0];



```

/*@ predicate sorted{L}(int* a, int length) =
    \forall integer i,j; 0 <= i <= j < length ==> a[i] <=a [j]; */

/*@ requires \valid(a+(0..length-1));
    requires sorted(a,length);
    requires length >= 0;

    assigns \nothing;

behavior exists:
    assumes \exists integer i; 0 <= i < length && a[i] == key;
    ensures a[\result] == key;

behavior not_exists:
    assumes \forall integer i; 0 <= i < length ==> a[i] != key;
    ensures \result == -1;


complete behaviors;
disjoint behaviors; */
int search(int* a, int length, int key);
  
```



## Several tools inside a single platform

- ▶ **plug-in architecture** *à la* Eclipse [S. @F-IDE'15]
- ▶ tools provided as plug-ins
  - ▶ 21 plug-ins in the open source distribution
  - ▶ a few outside open source plug-ins
  - ▶ close source plug-ins, either at CEA (about 20) or outside
- ▶ plug-ins connected to a **kernel**
  - ▶ provides an uniform setting
  - ▶ provides general services
  - ▶ synthesizes useful information
  - ▶ **analyzer combinations** [Correnson & S. @FMICS'12]





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long ra  
for 0 =>  
C1) if (m  
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re of the

tmp2[j][i] = 0; // i < (Nb1 - 1) else if (tmp1[j][i] >= 0) // i < (Nb1 - 1) tmp2[j][i] = (1 << (Nb1 - 1)) - 1; else tmp2[j][i] = tmp1[j][i]; /\* Then the second part takes like the first one: \*/  
tmp1[i][k] = 0; k <= k; k++) tmp1[i][k] += mc2[i][k] \* tmp2[k][j]; /\* The [i][j] coefficient of the matrix product MC2\*TMP2, that is, \*MC2\*(TMP1) = MC2\*(MC1\*M1) = MC2\*M1\*MC1  
i = 1; tmp1[i][i] >>= 1; \*/ Final rounding: tmp2[i][i] is now represented on 9 bits: \*if (tmp1[i][i] < -256) m2[i][i] = -256; else if (tmp1[i][i] > 255) m2[i][i] = 255; else m2[i][i] = tmp1[i][i];





## Domain of variations of variables of the program

- ▶ **abstract interpretation** [Cousot & Cousot @POPL'77]
- ▶ **automatic** analysis, but fine tuning required
- ▶ **correct** over-approximation (e.g.  $x \in [1..99]$ ,  $1\%2$ )
- ▶ **alarms** for potential undefined behaviors
- ▶ may ensure **absence of undefined behaviors**
- ▶ alarms for potential **invalid ACSL annotations**
- ▶ **graphical interface** : display the domain of each variable at each program point



- ▶ Frama-C plug-in for Value Analysis
- ▶ generic analysis on the abstract domain
- ▶ allow combination of abstract domains and some inter-reductions of their states
- ▶ should be easy to add new domain
  - ▶ domains was added (e.g. Apron) and are still being added



(long na  
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the design relies on the separation between :

### ▶ values

- ▶ **abstraction** of the possible C **values** of an expression
- ▶ **abstract** transformers for arithmetic **operators** on expressions
- ▶ **communication interface** for abstract domains

### ▶ domains

- ▶ **abstraction** of the set of **reachable states** at a program point
- ▶ **abstract** transformers of **states** through statements
- ▶ can be queried for the values of some C expressions

- ▶ [Bühler, Jakobowski and Blazy @VMCAI'17]



can we guarantee absence of defaults in large system-level code ?

- ▶ scada systems of 100+ kloc of C code
- ▶ highest certification requirements (IEC60880 class 1)
- ▶ pinpoint the undefined behaviors and help investigate their cause
- ▶ structural properties on memory separation and cyclic behaviors
- ▶ 80% code coverage, 200 alarms
- ▶ [Ourghanlian in Nuclear Engineering and Technology, 2015]



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tmp1[i][k] = 0; k = 0; k <= k-1; tmp1[i][k] += mc2[i][k] \* tmp2[k][j]; /\* The [i,j] coefficient of the matrix product MC2\*TMP2, that is, \*MC2\*(TMP1) = MC2\*(MC1\*M1) = MC2\*M1\*MC1  
i = 1; tmp1[i][i] >= -1; /\* Final rounding: tmp2[i][i] is now represented on 9 bits: \*if (tmp1[i][i] < -256) m2[i][i] = -256; else if (tmp1[i][i] > 255) m2[i][i] = 255; else m2[i][i] = tmp1[i][i];



- ▶ **E-ACSL plug-in** [Delahaye, Kosmatov & S. @SAC'13]
- ▶ program transformation which generates an inline **monitor**
- ▶ **verify annotations at runtime**
- ▶ **input** : program  $P$  annotated with (E-)ACSL
- ▶ **output** : program  $P'$  which
  - ▶ is equivalent to  $P$  for valid inputs; otherwise
  - ▶ fails on the first violated annotation



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```
char succ(char x) {
  /*@ assert x+1 <= 127; */
  return x+1;
}
```

E-ACSL

```
char succ(char x) {
  /*@ assert x+1 <= 127; */
  e_acsl_assert(x+1 <= 127);
  return x+1;
}
```




### Monitoring

- ▶ undefined behaviors with plug-in RTE
  - ▶ memory accesses
  - ▶ arithmetic overflows
- ▶ complex functional properties
- ▶ memory consumption
- ▶ correct API usage with plug-in Aorai
- ▶ information flow issue with plug-in SecureFlow





- ▶ **information flow analysis** : verify absence of leakage of sensitive data (termination insensitive non interference)



- ▶ [Assaf et al @SEC'13, Barany @VPT'16]



Frama-C is also a tool of choice for your security analyses

- ▶ **TIS-analyzer** and **TIS-interpreter** [TrustInSoft]
- ▶ **taint analysis** [Ceara, Mounier and Potet @ICSTW'10]
- ▶ source code model for **physical attacks** on smart cards [Berthomé et al @PLAS'10]
- ▶ **fault injection** in implementations of cryptographic protocols [Christofi's PhD thesis, 2013]
- ▶ **secure generative programming** [Anin and Rompf @POPL'17]
- ▶ security **counter-measures** based on static detection and runtime assertion checking of CVEs [Pariente & S., submitted]



- ▶ **Frama-C**, collaborative framework for C code verification
  - ▶ open and extensible framework
  - ▶ both academic and industrial usage
- ▶ **Eva** (Frama-C plug-in)
  - ▶ verify the absence of undefined behaviors
  - ▶ may help prevent security flaws
- ▶ **E-ACSL** (Frama-C plug-in)
  - ▶ runtime verification
  - ▶ bug finding tool
  - ▶ verify more properties than testing or other dynamic tools
- ▶ **SecureFlow** (Frama-C plug-in)
  - ▶ verify non-interference
  - ▶ in combination with Eva and/or E-ACSL



<http://frama-c.com>

- ▶ F. Kirchner, N. Kosmatov, V. Prevosto, J. Signoles, and B. Yakobowski.  
*Frama-C : a Software Analysis Perspective.* FAC'2015.
- ▶ D. Bühler, B. Yakobowski, and S. Blazy.  
*Structuring Abstract Interpreters through State and Value Abstractions* VMCAI'17.
- ▶ N. Kosmatov, and J. Signoles.  
*A lesson on runtime assertion checking with Frama-C (tutorial).* RV'2013.
- ▶ M. Assaf, J. Signoles, É. Total, and F. Tronel.  
*Program transformation for non-interference verification on programs with pointers.* SEC'2013.

